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ABSTRACT  
The thesis focuses on the main international legal aspects of the annexation by one State, 
namely the Russian Federation, of a part of another sovereign State, Ukraine. The 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula is the first forced border shift of a State in Europe. The 
invading State justifies these actions by referring to the ethnic and historical ties between 
Russia and Crimea, basing its aggression on the right of peoples to self-determination. The 
peaceful coexistence of States and various nationalities within the European Union, the 
United States, Asia and the Middle East is now under threat. This Bachelor thesis aims to 
study the issue of the forcible seizure of the Crimean Peninsula, the internal and external 
causes of this crisis, as well as possible measures to stabilize the situation and prevent such 
situations in the near future in the context of existing mechanisms of international law. The 
aim of this work is also to analyse the legal norms that legitimize the Crimean annexation by 
Russia, and international legal acts that confirm the fact that Russia violated most of the 
fundamental international documents. 
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SUMMARY 
The thesis analyses the internal reasons of Ukraine that led to the possibility of annexation 
of part of its sovereign territory by another State, as well as external reasons that contributed 
to the aggressor country to seize part of its independent territory.   
 After the end of the East-West conflict and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 
seemed that the victory of Western democracy was imminent, and the Cold War would be 
over once and for all. It seemed to us that Europe and the entire world system were 
embedded in a stable world order and an international security structure. Russia, after all, 
was no longer perceived as a threat. The end of the Cold War and the time of eternal peace 
seemed to have come finally and irrevocably. Only about twenty years after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War the situation did change. Today, everything 
has changed- Russian and Western military advisers are in the East of Ukraine, opposing 
and supporting various warring parties, Russia has withdrawn from the G8 Union of the 
most powerful developed States. The world order is being challenged incomparable since 
the end of World War II.   The triggers of this split between Russia and the 
Western community should be found in the conflict that began in late 2013 in Ukraine and 
in this context, in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Currently, the 
invading State justifies these actions by pointing to the ethnic and historical ties between 
Russia and Crimea, basing its aggression on the right of peoples to self-determination. The 
Bachelor thesis is aimed at examining the legal arguments in opposition to the Russian 
position in its aggression. Moreover, it analyses the most significant legal acts of 
international law violated by the aggressor country, as well as legal documents previously 
concluded between countries involved in this conflict, and the impact of these violations on 
the entire system of international law and international security. The main task of this 
Bachelor thesis is to analyse legal norms to study possible methods of protecting Ukraine in 
international judicial institutions for the return of lost territories, as well as possible methods 
of countering such violations, including when conducting a hybrid war by aggressor 
countries and manipulating international legal doctrines.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
During the dispute over the status of the Crimean Peninsula and the on-going armed 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the international community has faced difficult events in 
regard to geopolitical situation, democratic values and international law and international 
politics seem to be increasingly questioned, including the right of people to self-
determination, the prohibition of violence, and the territorial integrity of States. 
"Annexation", "humanitarian intervention", or "occupation" - the choice of the term that 
defines Russia's actions is of a crucial importance in this context. In addition, from a legal 
point of view, the important question is about the reasons that allowed such a conflict to 
happen, about the legal mechanisms that allowed one country to seize part of another's 
territory. 
Nowadays, international society is confronted with the fact that the conflict that 
occurred in Ukraine might be repeated in any other State, especially if it was previously a 
part of the Soviet Union or is a part of the sphere of interests of Russia. Therefore, many 
aspects must be a subject to examination, mainly, internal and external causes of the 
conflict. Hence, the whole process of the annexation and assessment, its consequences 
and opportunities of settlement of the conflict, in order to prevent such excesses in the 
future, so that the actions of the aggressor country, its arguments and legal position 
cannot lead to a rethinking of international law and its principles. Thus, the main question 
to be examined is: ''How has Russia breached international law to seizure a territory of 
another State while explaining in the society legitimacy of its actions?''.  
The methodology for the Bachelor thesis would cover doctrinal research in terms 
of analysis of the legislation, from the perspective of international law, followed by 
examination of the relevant provisions of national laws of the countries in question, as 
well as focusing on examination of the agreements concluded between the countries. 
Doctrinal research would be supported by qualitative analysis, including academics 
opinions on the subject matter, official documentation from the relevant authorities and 
use of the information provided by official news broadcasting authorities.  The 
interdisciplinary part of the Bachelor thesis specifically focuses on analysis of political 
aspects that potentially had led to the breach of international law, thus establishing the 
political reasons for the following annexation of the Crimea. 
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PART I: CAUSES OF THE CRIMEAN ANNEXATION BY RUSSIA IN 2014 
 
In order to understand the conflict in 2014 and annexation of Crimea, there is a need to 
analyse situation in Ukraine since 2007. The conflict in Ukraine was based on the 
emerging conflict between the Pro-Russian authorities that had grown out of the post-
Soviet space and the attempt of promoting new democratic orientation by directing its 
population towards Western countries. This crisis – when Ukraine sought democracy in 
opposition to Russian attempts to stop the development of democratic regimes in the 
post-Soviet space- most clearly confirms the fact of Ukraine's desire for European 
Integration and Russia's strong opposition to Ukraine signing an Agreement with the EU. 
Analysis of the reasons that led to Euromaidan will allow to establish a causal link with 
further events, namely, with Russia's aggression and annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula. 
1.1. External causes: Euromaidan and European integration of 
Ukraine 
 
Since 2007, the European Union and Ukraine had held discussions about the conclusion 
of the Agreement regarding the Association of the Union and Ukraine. Despite the 
lengthy procedure, Ukraine finally decided in favour of European integration and on 
March 30, 2012, Ukraine - European Union Association Agreement was initialled by the 
heads of delegations of the European Union and Ukraine,
1
 but in November 2013, upon 
the initiative on the part of Ukraine, the process of preparation for signing the Agreement 
had been suspended again. The refusal of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to 
sign the Agreement with the EU may be considered as undermining the patience of most 
                                                 
1
 European Union External Action Service, European Council. EU-Ukraine Association Agreement “Guide 
to the Association Agreement”, pp.1-3. Available on: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/images/top_stories/140912_eu-ukraine-associatin-agreement-
quick_guide.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2020. 
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Ukrainian citizens and become a reason for mass public protests throughout the whole 
country. 
2
 
 In order to understand the reasoning behind the President’s Viktor Yanukovych’s 
fluctuations which are indeed triggered by the policy of authorities of the Russian 
Federation, the content of a given Agreement shall be considered. The following analysis 
would clarify, why the refusal to conclude an Agreement has led Ukraine to Euromaidan, 
consequently to a new revolution and loss of the territories.  
1.2. European integration of Ukraine 
Further analysis of the terms of the Agreement provides an opportunity to observe 
completely new principles of Ukrainian development in terms of European integration, 
mainly based on economic and political values, set as objectives to reach the following 
integration. For the purposes of the analysis, these principles shall be divided in two main 
parts.            
 Firstly, economic principles, looking at the perspective of the potential economic 
benefits in terms of trade and overall harmonization of market for the Ukraine arising 
from the respective agreement and Russia’s opposition shall be inspected. Secondly, 
political-legal principles, serving as fundamental part for the European integration of the 
Ukraine shall be a subject to the following analysis.  
1.2.1. Economic principles 
Objectives specified Article 1 of the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement 
including Part c)  
“to promote, preserve and strengthen peace and stability in the regional and international dimensions in 
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the objectives of the Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe of 1990” 3 
 
undoubtedly reflected the position of the European Union and Ukraine at the same time 
and this commitment of the parties is unlikely to be a milestone for Russia in its 
resistance regarding the Agreement. Then, the following issue shall be examined, what 
are the circumstances that could explain Russia’s opposition.     
                                                 
2
 Ukraine withdraws from signing the Association Agreement in Vilnius: The motives and implications, 
available on: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-11-27/ukraine-withdraws-signing-
association-agreement-vilnius-motives-and. Published November 27, 2013. Accessed April 5, 2020. 
3
Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, 
of the other part OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3–2137. Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.161.01.0003.01.ENG. Accessed February 10, 2020. Article 
1.  
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 Most experts
4
 indicate an innovative step in questions related to the embodiment 
of European integration direction of Ukraine, more specifically the drafting and 
provisional signing of the Agreement regarding the Association between the European 
Union and Ukraine in 2008.  In the context of the Agreement, the EU and Ukraine 
conducted negotiations about the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas CISFTA 
within which parties would not only consider tariff reduction but also trade cost reduction 
at the cost of the harmonisation of the regular practices and simplification of customs 
regime.
5
 
In fact, economic aspects of the Agreement can be also described while looking at 
statistical data which demonstrated that in 2014 export from Ukraine to European Union 
has increased for 5 percent, the volume of exports of Ukrainian goods to the EU for 10 
months of 2019 amounted to $17.4 billion, which is 6.1 percent more than in the same 
period of 2018.
6
 
Apparent unwillingness of Russia to accept European-Ukrainian Association on 
the aforementioned conditions bearing in mind long-term perspective and as a 
consequence rise of Ukrainian economy and Ukrainian exit out of the area where Russia 
exerts influence, all of this led Ukraine to national disturbance, Euromaidan.  
 
1.2.2. Political-legal principles 
Political-legal principles led to the concept that circumstances regarding European- 
Ukrainian Association and parties’ relations shall be based upon well-established 
principles and traditions of the European Union. By concluding the Association 
Agreement, Ukraine announced its determination to proceed with new performance 
objectives. More precisely, to evolve from a post-Soviet country obliged to follow the EU 
principles under the threat of being isolated from the civilised world, to one of the 
countries constituting the civilised world.
7
 
                                                 
4
 Matthew Goodwill, Europe and post-Soviet countries. Interaction conditions, SAGE  Journals, 2013; 
Sabine Fischer, EU und Ukraine auf dem Weg der Zusammenarbeit, 2013, Das Neue Berlin. 
5
 European Commission. Countries and regions: Ukraine. Available on: 
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine/. Accessed February 5, 2020. 
6
 Державна Служба Статистики Україны, available on: http://ukrstat.gov.ua/. Accessed on: March 2, 
2020. 
7
 Odysseas Spiliopoulos, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as a Framework of Integration Between 
The Two Parties, The Economies of Balkan and Eastern Europe Countries in the Changed World (EBEEC 
2013)” Available on: www.sciencedirect.com.  Accessed March 3, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-
5671(14)00027-6. 
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In addition, the Agreement included provisions of security guarantees for Ukraine, 
specifically provisions that make parties bound to respect principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and independence.
8
 
Harmonization of standards, technical regulation and procedures of conformity 
assessment prescribed by CISFTA, after its implementation in Ukraine in accordance 
with EU accepted norms, had to led to the following consequences:  
1. Increased capacity for the export of Ukrainian goods, not merely to EU 
countries but also to the third world countries, which would significantly 
enhance external economic potential of the country.  
2. Strengthened positions of the national manufacturers also in the local market 
in Ukraine, which would provide high quality products for Ukrainian 
consumers.  
3. Appearance of the expanded opportunities for the import substitution, thus 
expansion of the export would contribute to enhancement of foreign trade 
balance in the country.  
4. Ukraine would get a chance to receive a partial compensation for expenditures 
referred to the harmonization at expense of financial and technical assistance 
on the part of EU.
9
 
The Agreement was a further step on the path to the development of a democratic society 
in Ukraine, while forming more mutual social, economic and civil society. Long-standing 
commitment of the Ukrainian citizens for sharing democratic vision and universal human 
values which are put forward repeatedly in order to serve political game of the Viktor 
Yanukovych’s administration, in fact escalated into a nationwide anger. Mass public 
protests in the capital city Kiev and all over the country resulted in the change of 
government in Ukraine in 2014.
10
  
 These protests where citizens of the country demonstrated frustration concerning 
the ignorance of their legitimate interests and requirements are known as Euromaidan in 
                                                 
8
 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, 
of the other part OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3–2137. Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.161.01.0003.01.ENG. Accessed February 10, 2020.  
9
 Rilka Dragneva, Kataryna Wolczuk, “Russia, the Eurasian Customs  Union and the EU: Cooperation, 
Stagnation or Rivalry”, CHATHAM House, Russia and Eurasia Programme briefing paper (2012): 1-16 
Available on: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_drag
nevawolczuk.pdf. Accessed March 5, 2020. 
10
 Pro-European Businessman Claims Victory in Ukraine Presidential Vote, available on: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/26/world/europe/ukraine-elections.html. Published May 25, 2014. 
Accessed April 3, 2020.  
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social media and means of mass communication by analogy to the events that took place 
in 2004.
11
 
 In fact, this is exactly what happened - Ukraine's withdrawal from the sphere of 
Russian influence became the trigger, the starting point for the further annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula. Of course, Russia claims that Crimea was incorporated into the 
Russian Federation based on the results of the Crimean referendum and the referendum in 
Sevastopol, but the referendum is only a mechanism. For this mechanism to be launched, 
it took a while. And when the Russian authorities saw that they were losing their 
influence over Ukraine and when they saw that the Ukrainians do not want to be a loyal 
vassal, but want to decide their own fate and move towards European unification is a 
mechanism for capturing someone else's territory was launched. Everything further is 
fear for the Russian-speaking population, support for the people of Crimea in their 
expression of will, military presence to prevent violent excesses against civilians, 
preparation of internal Russian legislation, all this became only the implementation of the 
annexation plan, the implementation of the capture mechanism. Nevertheless, the trigger 
was Euromaidan, which grew directly from the refusal of the Yanukovich government to 
sign an Agreement with the EU. Professor Georg Bäuml and Dr Lars Colschen from 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München holds the following position:  
"Of course Russia has always feared the extension of the power potential of NATO, the approximation of 
its military infrastructure to Russia's borders and deployment of military contingents of foreign States in the 
vicinity of its border, but it was the events of Euromaidan have shown Russia that if Ukraine decides to join 
NATO, Russia will not be able to change Ukraine`s standing similarly as Russia could not  from signing an 
Agreement with the EU. On this background, all the assurances of the Ukrainian government, as well as the 
leadership of the Alliance that this will not happen, were no longer perceived by the Russian authorities. 
The realization of the loss of a loyal ally, who chose the European Union, rather than friendship with his 
older brother, opened a Pandora's Box and forced Russia to hastily implement a further scenario of 
annexation."
12
 
 While analysing the Agreement that was supposed to be signed between the EU 
and Ukraine, one can draw the indubitable conclusion- the transition of another post-
Soviet country to the sphere of European influence. The transition thus implies political 
terms, which are especially important for the developing countries, and economic terms 
                                                 
11
 Steve York, Hardy Merriman, Miriam Zimmerman, Cynthia Boaz, “Orange Revoultion: Study Guide”, 
York Zimmerman Incorporated (2010): 1-20, p. Available on: https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Orange-Revolution-Study-Guide-2.pdf. Accessed March 11, 2020. 
12
 Münchner Nachrichten zur Jurisprudenz und Politikwissenschaft herausgegeben von Geschwister-
Scholl-Institut, 2016. 
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that played the role of a catalyst for the subsequent chain reaction - first the Maidan, and 
later the military intervention of Russia, both in the Crimea and in the South of Ukraine.
13
 
 Obviously, the most important symbolic significance of "Europe" for self-
determination and unification of the part of Ukrainian society that opposed the growing 
authoritarianism and corruption of the government. The European choice, rapprochement 
with the EU, looked to these people to gradually create transparent political and 
economic institutions in Ukraine that would be controlled by society, and not by 
oligarchic clans. 
 
1.3. Euromaidan   
 
In November 21, 2013, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov announced that 
Ukraine was suspending the process of preparing to sign an Association Agreement with 
the EU. This decision served as a trigger for the start of a mass protest movement.
14 
For 
in-depth analysis, there is a need to understand whether the right of people for self-
determination provided by the current constitution of Ukraine or an overthrow of the duly 
elected president resulted in governmental coup.   
 This question requires an analysis because Maidan is one of the reasons for all the 
further events that have taken place in Ukraine, more specifically on the Crimean 
Peninsula. If Maidan was indeed a governmental coup, revolution, overthrow of the duly 
elected president, then international community is not able to lawfully recognize neither 
the new government that replaced Viktor Yanukovych and accordingly, nor currently 
existing authorities of Ukraine. But if Maidan became one of the forms of expression of 
the will of the people that led to the transitional government, then it was on Euromaidan 
that the principle of self-determination of people was implemented, which is enshrined in 
the principles of international law and the Constitution of Ukraine. 
 By virtue of the principle of equality and self-determination of the people set out 
in Charter of the United Nations, all nations have a right freely determinate without any 
interference one’s political status and conduct its economic, social and cultural 
development and every single State shall respect this right in accordance to the UN 
                                                 
13
 Паниотто В., Хмелько В. Восток Украины: Социология страхов // Радио Свобода. 08.05.2014. 
14
 OSW. Ukraine withdraws from signing the Association Agreement in Vilnius: The motives and 
implications, available on: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-11-27/ukraine-withdraws-
signing-association-agreement-vilnius-motives-and. Published November 27, 2013. Accessed April 6, 
2020. 
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Charter.
15
 Maidan in the present case is an exact realization of this right, including 
economic development for Ukrainian people. It does not mean at all that was a revolution 
or overthrow of the existing government, because shift of power from Viktor 
Yanukovych took place in full conformity with internal legislation of Ukraine. 
Additionally, the following fact shall be taken into consideration that throughout the 
existence of Ukraine as an independent post-Soviet State, namely since 1991
16
, many 
things in the political reality were changed by the influence of political expediency. 
Under the influence of this factor in 2005 in Ukraine there were different changes 
made, for example, the third tour of elections was conducted which is not introduced by 
the Constitution
17
, in 2007 president Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree about the re-
election in Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada which have many ongoing disputes in the Courts 
of Ukraine. Thus, in 2010, changes in Constitution of Ukraine have been made due to the 
decision of a Constitutional Court, which in fact has no competence in the legislative 
branch.  
 Yet all of these are solely internal matters within Ukraine as of an independent 
State. It should not be forgotten that in accordance with a Declaration on Principles of 
International Law none of the States or a group of States do not have a right to interfere 
nor directly neither indirectly in internal or external matters of another State for any 
reason whatsoever.  
 Euromaidan was one of the means for population to express their will for 
determination both economically and politically. It should be emphasised that the change 
from Pro-Russian president Yanukovych took place in a peaceful manner. This 
constitutes evidence of legitimacy for all of the further election procedures in Ukraine. 
According to the president of the Venice Commission of European Commission for 
Democracy through Law Gianni Buquicchio: "since the victory of Euromaidan 
movement, the level of political corruption in Ukraine has decreased."
18
 Thus, 
Euromaidan served as one of the tools for Ukrainian people to express their selves that 
                                                 
15
 Charter of the United Nations. Available on: https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-
i/index.html. Accessed April 10, 2020. 
16
 Euromaidan Press. Independence Day of Ukraine: facts & brief history, available on: 
http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/08/24/independence-day-of-ukraine-facts-brief-history/. Published 
August 24, 2019. Accessed February 6, 2020. 
17
 Volodymyr Paniotto, “Ukraine: Presidential Elections 2004 and the Orange Revolution”: 1-27, p. 
Available on: 
https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/articles/president%20election%20in%20ukraine%202004.pdf. Accessed 
February 10, 2020. 
18
 112 Ukraine. Venice Commission: Level of political corruption in Ukraine decreased, available on: 
https://112.international/politics/venice-commission-level-of-political-corruption-in-ukraine-decreased-
10023.html. Published October 7, 2016. Accessed March 20, 2020. 
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led to the legal consequences in the form of early presidential elections and State Duma 
and the most important signing of the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement 
in accordance with expectations of the people. People, as a fundamental element for 
Ukraine to exist as a State.  
 
1.4. Internal causes: increase of power  
 
Because of the loss of its influence over a country that has historically been considered 
one of Russia's closest allies, Russia has chosen to create its own concept of international 
law. Russia remained the largest territorial State in the world after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and considering itself as a "Big Brother" in relation to the CIS countries-
immigrants from the Soviet Union. Russia has begun to interpret international law so 
that, when necessary, it would allow the country to defend its own territory, therefore 
react to perceived threats to its sovereignty, and, by virtue of the following interpretation, 
Russia would remain one of the largest countries on the world arena. As a former Empire, 
Russia still has an exclusively Imperial mind-set, and for this reason, Russia's foreign 
policy doctrines, both during the Soviet period and after it, demonstrate a preference for 
an interpretation of international law that gives priority to its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.
19
          
 However, according to Russia, this does not apply to its smaller neighbouring 
countries in the same manner. The prioritization of State sovereignty comes at the 
expense of concepts such as human rights, democracy and the right of peoples to self - 
determination because too many freedoms are defined by Russia as a threat to the Central 
government and partly also to the territorial integrity of the country.
20
   
  Russia experienced the peak of its power in 1945 and in the following 
decades. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 significantly changed the map of 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, but Russia's understanding of 
International Law remained largely in the position of 1945.
21
 When Russia talks about the 
                                                 
19
 Francisco Martínez, “On the Peripheral Character of Russia”, para.  Available on: 
https://journals.openedition.org/eces/1562, accessed March 5, 2020, doi: https://doi.org/10.4000/eces.1562.  
20
 Кулаков Андрей, О влиянии глобализационных процессов на пограничную безопасность 
Российской Федерации.  
21
 Mark Harrison, “The Soviet Union after 1945: Economic Recovery and Political Repression”, 
Department of Economics, University of Warwick (2010): 1-17, p. Available on: 
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importance of International Law, it means protecting the geopolitical achievements of the 
USSR. In addition, the fact that Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union at that time has 
serious consequences for this country today. Since in the Russian sense, International 
Law applies only to those powers that were already strong and sovereign in 1945. At the 
same time, States that regained their independence in 1991, should always be ready to 
negotiate with Moscow about their sovereignty, since, in Russia's opinion, it is not 
unconditional.
22
   Despite all existing agreements between Russia and 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation has always treated their implementation as a party with 
more rights in relation to its former satellite. For example, the State Duma of Russia 
urged Ukraine not to prevent the population of Crimea from holding a referendum on the 
approval of its Constitution in accordance with the initiatives of the Supreme Council of 
Crimea
23
 , despite the fact that according to the Constitution of Ukraine, which was in 
effect at that time, such a referendum was simply illegal. The same "Big Brother" policy 
pursued by Russia, in relation to the status of Sevastopol – despite all International 
Treaties that enshrine the status of this city as the territory of Ukraine, Russia did not 
abandon attempts, even indirectly, to assert its rights to this city.
24
 This is the reason is 
why the reaction of the former Empire to "insubordination" and the desire to maintain the 
status of a world power resulted in military intervention and annexation of part of an 
independent State. Unfortunately, the Russian legal system in international legal relations 
is built on the absolutization of the Bachelor thesis "Russia is a great world power". 
Considering that the loss of influence on Ukraine and the latter's transition to the Western 
camp undermine its position and world status, Russia applied the same selective 
interpretation of International Law, showing the entire world community that the 
sovereignty of some States is not important for Russia.     
    According to the position of the Russian Federation, 
Crimea was admitted to Russia, because of the Crimean referendum, which means that 
there was self-determination of the people. Therefore, Russia, as a rightful country of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/pp2011postprint.pdf. Accessed March 5, 
2020. 
22
 Dr. Gennady M. Danilenko, “Implementation Of International Law In Russia 
And Other Cis States” (1998): 1-42, p.. Available on: https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/danilenk.pdf. 
Accessed March 3, 2020. 
23
 SEVKRIMRUS.NAROD.RU.Постановление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания 
Российской Федерации в связи с обращением Верховного Совета Крыма, available on:  
http://sevkrimrus.narod.ru/ZAKON/1995ref.htm. (Resolution of the State Duma of the Russian Federation 
No. 604-1 DG of March 22, 1995) Accessed February 19, 2020. 
24
 Evgeny Voronin, Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, Alexey  Nikolaev, The Coup d’état in Kiev in February 2014: 
International Law Context and Consequences 
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world community, only recognized this right of the Crimean people. Russia prefers not to 
recall that the representative authorities of Crimea and Sevastopol had no right to hold a 
referendum on the status of the Peninsula, since article 73 of the Constitution of Ukraine 
stipulates that questions about changing the territory of Ukraine shall be resolved 
exclusively by an all-Ukrainian referendum.
25
 Russia does not take it into consideration, 
or argue that the existence of the provisions of the Constitution of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea since 1998, which could run counter to the decision of the Supreme 
power of Ukraine, initially carried an internal contradiction, but it cannot be considered 
as a violation of International Law, since if it is a conflict, it is a conflict of internal law 
of Ukraine. As for the violation of the principle of territorial integrity of a State, 
Russia believes that this principle protects the territory of a State from external 
interference and refers to the interaction of independent States, and not to processes 
within a single State. For example, Article 2, Paragraph 4, of the UN Charter States: "All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"
26
 According to the 
provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: 
"The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating 
States.
27
 Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, 
political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any 
such action, constituting a threat or use of force. The participating States will likewise 
refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct 
or indirect measures of force in contravention of International Law.
28
  
1.5.  Collapse of Crimean Peninsula 
  
The rejection of European integration by the current government, popular unrest that 
resulted from the crisis of the political system of Ukraine, caused the collapse of the 
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political system in Crimea. The influence of the Maidan, and especially its paramilitary 
component, was crucial in the key phase of the crisis in February-March 2014. Maidan 
pushed the parliamentary opposition to take more radical action, which was opposed by 
the increasingly weak and losing support of traditional allies of the Yanukovich regime. 
However, it also pushed Crimean politicians, who rely on political ties with the Russian 
Federation, to take decisive action.       
 Then it is significant to understand what led to the crisis and the collapse of 
Crimea as part of Ukraine, moreover, to find out the reasons for further annexation. 
Perhaps initially, this is since the Peninsula by many Russian politicians and prominent 
public figures was regarded to be a disputed territory since the collapse of the USSR and 
regardless of all the agreements reached by Russia and Ukraine.   
 For instance, Russian politician, former mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov, during 
his speeches on many occasions was saying that Crimea belongs to Russia "beyond 
political realities and geographical maps"
29
. Thus, in accordance with his position, 
Luzhkov was a member of the Federation Council (1996-2000)
30
 and became a member 
of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building. In 
December 1996, at the initiative of Luzhkov, the Federation Council of the Russian 
Federation recognized Sevastopol as part of the territory of Russia
31
 and qualified the 
actions of the Ukrainian leadership to reject it as contrary to International Law.  
 One more example is Alexander Solzhenitsyn who was the most famous Russian 
"Democrat", but his attitude to Ukraine and the Crimea is perfectly described in the essay 
"How we should equip Russia". Solzhenitsyn wrote that the Ukrainians were separated 
from the Russians "only by the terrible misfortune of the Mongol invasion and Polish 
colonization." He called the existence of the Ukrainian language "false".
32
  After the 
"Orange revolution", the writer said that the Crimea and the Eastern regions were 
allegedly forcibly under the rule of Kiev. "Vast expanses that have never belonged to 
historical Ukraine, like Novorossiya, Crimea, and the entire South-Eastern region, are 
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forcibly squeezed into the current Ukrainian State and its policy of eagerly desired 
NATO membership," Solzhenitsyn said in the spring of 2006.
33
    
 Back in 2010, when in an interview with "Echo of Moscow radio" , the head of 
the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, directly stated that in 5 
years part of Ukraine should become part of Russia.
34
      
 "Today, 5 years after reunification, it is a delight and amazement to know that the Russian 
Peninsula again is on the Russian land. The LDPR has claimed this for almost 30 years. I spoke about the 
inevitability of this as early as June 7, 1992, at a rally in Simferopol. Many people shouted, grumbled, and 
did not believe it, but this happened. And now, 27 years later, we are holding a rally at the same place, but 
in the Russian Simferopol..."
35
,          
 Vladimir Zhirinovsky said during his speech at a protest in Sevastopol, held on 
March 15, 2019.         
 During the NATO summit in Bucharest, April 4, 2008, he speaks about the 
reasoning of the Ukraine:         
 "The South of Ukraine is completely-there are only one Russian (...) Crimea was simply received 
by Ukraine by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. Who can tell us that we have no interests there?"
36
    
 However, before 2014 Russia never publicly expressed its territorial interests on 
Peninsula. In January 2014, everything changes when protests began to involve force, 
victims appeared and all around the country takeovers of regional administrations took 
place and position of President Yanukovych started to falter. Meanwhile, Pro-Russian 
movement began in Sevastopol chaired by a local businessman Aleksei Chaly. On 
February 20, 2014 the first sign of the collapse appeared when a speaker of Crimean 
Parliament Vladimir Konstantinov announced that in case of the change of government in 
Kiev, Crimean Peninsula can separate from Ukraine.
37
      
 Already on February 21 President Yanukovych and opposition concluded an 
Agreement prescribing the transfer of the power. In accordance with the Agreement, the 
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president remains in power until the autumn 2014
38
 and in Ukraine Constitution of 2004 
comes into force where there are limitations for the power of the head of government. 
This Agreement gained support from Western countries including United States and 
Russia. Tensions in Crimea slightly decreased, for instance, extraordinary session that 
was scheduled in Verkhovna Rada of Crimea was cancelled. On the next day political 
situation significantly changed again.       
 On February 22, 2014 Parliament of Ukraine rendered a decision about the 
resignation of President Yanukovych and power shifted to the leaders of Maidan headed 
by Oleksandr Turchynov
39
 who had temporarily performed duties of the president. 
 By examining speeches of the Russian president Vladimir Putin that at that 
moment constantly sounded in Russian mass media
40
, it can be concluded that Putin 
considered indeed that the Agreement regarding the change of government is violated and 
felt deceived. This exacerbated Crimean Peninsula situation and in effect deprived the 
time from Crimea to get ready for the opposition
41
. After all, it is essential to understand 
how Pro-Russian performances began on the Peninsula. They started with the mistakes 
made by people who struggled for Ukraine, for its European future but unfortunately 
without having any political experience and political clear- sightedness. Power shifted to 
those individuals who previously supervised Maidan. On the one hand, these people were 
enormously supported within the country because they claimed changes that were 
required by the citizens of Ukraine, namely Euro integration, struggle against corruption, 
improvement of quality of life and most importantly self-determination of Ukrainian 
people exactly as Ukrainians. On the other hand, without having experience in 
implementation of such innovations especially about a whole country, mistakes were 
unavoidable and for the mistakes that were made had to pay a high price.    
 One of these mistakes undoubtedly was abolition of the law, which grants the 
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right for a second official language, in this specific case Russian language
42
. If this 
change has been made in a few years after Maidan, most probably it would not cause 
such consequences as it was those days when every wrong step in relation to enormous 
number of citizens cause the storm. For Crimea where almost 60 percent are Russians by 
nationality
43
, however the percentage of Russians is much higher because a vast part of 
people also recognizes themselves as being Russians, even though statistics show another 
number, the abolition of law caused catalyst in addition skilfully used by Russian 
politicians.            
 Oddly enough, majority of the Crimean population were politically passive and 
had no mechanisms of civil self-organization for protests except for Sevastopol where 
civic movement was organized and led by Aleksei Chaly, and these actions in the result 
affected the further events. Sevastopol was a city in the South-West part of Ukraine 
where Kiev scenario was first applied. More specifically, capture of the governmental 
institutions and organizations of parallel bodies of authority. Already on February 23 
Aleksei Chaly was proclaimed a people’s mayor44 and local law enforcement agencies 
started to support new mayor. However, Sevastopol as a naval base of Russia always was 
a mansion in that region. In the city that served as a naval base for centuries, full of 
military personnel and their family members who were always strong with Pro-Russian 
attitude
45
. Quite different situation was in the capital of Crimea Simferopol. In that 
regard, it is worth noting that even though there were also ongoing trainings for Pro-
Russian performances but in comparison to Sevastopol where this process became 
widespread from the very beginning, in Simferopol it was different. For the meeting 
scheduled on February 26 next to Verkhovna Rada of Crimea arrived around two 
thousands of Pro-Russian activists who were immediately blocked by multi-thousand 
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Crimean Tatar meeting.
46
    Apparently, these events gave illusion to the 
new Ukrainian government that centre of Pro-Russian performances is in Sevastopol and 
it will not spread further. Instead of making corrections in the situation and preventing 
Russian influence on the Peninsula, central authority sharpened its focus on Kiev more 
specifically on the struggle of establishing coalition in the new Parliament. This was one 
more mistake because instead of sharing portfolios and ministerial offices, Ukrainian 
politicians had concentrated on preventing Hybrid War on their territory even if it is 
about one city.  They had to get across separatist movements in Simferopol, but this has 
not been done and consequently Hybrid War escalated into military intervention on 
behalf of Russia.     As it was already stated above, on February 
26 Crimean Tatars indeed pushed back participants of the Pro-Russian meeting from the 
building of Verkhovna Rada
47
 and at the night building has been seized by armed forces 
in cylinders hung Russia flag on it.
48
 Consequently, Ukraine started to lose control over 
the situation. On the next day February 27, Special Forces of Russian Federation were 
placed in the building of Verkhovna Rada and in the mayor’s office of Simferopol. The 
same day an extraordinary meeting of Verkhovna Rada was convoked where Sergey 
Aksyonov was elected for the position of Prime Minister of Crimea and general 
referendum regarding the expansion of the powers Crimea was already scheduled for 
May 2014.
49
 Literally, one week later after this event during the next meeting of 
Verkhovna Rada it was decided to postpone referendum for March 16
50
 with a 
reformulated question of the plebiscite. Instead of reviewing a possibility to grant Crimea 
more power, it was planned to review the question of accession to Russia. One might say 
that one day it is too short period of time, but for example those who went to War would 
say that it is more than enough. Unfortunately, in a day of February 27 Ukrainian 
authorities did not do anything to change the situation.  Reaction of central authorities 
shocked the most because base on the speeches of the official authorities on that day, for 
example, speech of Oleksandr Turchynov as of a new head of the State, it can be 
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concluded that authorities of Ukraine were not ready to resist. Furthermore, authorities 
were not even able to provide guidance to the representatives of Crimean authority and to 
explain what to do in that situation. Excerpt from the speech of Oleksandr Turchynov 
illustrates abovementioned:  
"I invite you to not escalate the situation and to not attempt provocations. We can see what is 
going on in Crimea. And, all of us know that this is not truth. We are now discussing and making decisions 
how to proceed, and we also consult our Western colleagues and I am sating right.  We will solve the 
question given."
51
  
Confusion and hesitancy of the new Ukrainian authorities, Ukraine’s 
unpreparedness to immediately solve the crisis because of the lack of knowledge and 
experience and that gave rise to the annexation of Crimea.  
Starting from February 28 and during the first days of March, Russian military 
forces without any identification marks occupied all the strategic locations on the 
Peninsula and blocked Ukrainian army troops.  Shortly after that Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Security Service of Ukraine switched sides to the new Crimean authority and 
Prosecutor’s Office joined a bit later. Ukrainian army troops that were blocked stayed 
faithful for Ukraine until the referendum but after March 17, disarray began. As a result, 
approximately one third of military troops were still faithful for their country.
52
  
 
1 PART II: ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA  
 
Russia and Ukraine were interrelated by a long history. Following the collapse of USSR 
on February 14, 1992, a diplomatic relationship was once again established, now between 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In the first half of 1990s, the tension between 
Ukraine and Russia was caused by questions regarding property and the infrastructure of 
the Black Sea Fleet. Moscow did not want to lose the base points in Crimea, which had 
ended up under the Kiev jurisdiction, in accordance with the agreements reached by the 
States. On April 5, 1992, the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk had declared the 
USSR Black Sea Fleet a property of Ukraine. On April 7, the President of Russian 
Federation Boris Yeltsin had confirmed that declaration. As a result of Summer 
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negotiations of 1992, Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk had signed the Yalta Treaty on the 
Black Sea Fleet, agreeing on exerting the Black Sea Fleet out of the strategic forces of 
Commonwealth of Independent States, and the division of forces would be performed 
equally.
53
 In April 1994, Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk have signed an Agreement on 
gradual settlement of the Black Sea Fleet issue, according to which the Ukrainian Naval 
Forces and Russian Naval Fleet would be based separately. 
 On June 9, 1995, the Presidents of Russian Federation and Ukraine Boris Yeltsin 
and Leonid Kuchma respectively, have signed an Agreement on the bases of Ukrainian 
Navy and Russian Black Sea Fleet being separated. On May 28, 1997, in Kyiv, 
intergovernmental agreements were signed, which reinstated previously reached 
agreements and had a detailed description of the status and conditions of the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet residence within the waters of Crimea.
54
 Three days later, on May 31, 
1997, a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation had been signed, which reinforced the principle of strategic 
Partnership, recognition of the inviolability of existing borders and mutual commitment 
not to use its’ territory to harm the security of each other.55 On January 28, 2003, an 
Agreement was signed between Ukraine and Russian Federation considering the Russian-
Ukrainian State borders. On December 24, 2003, an Agreement between the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine on cooperation in the use of Azov sea and Kerch Strait.
56
 
 Therefore, at the beginning of Euromaidan and Crimea crisis, the relationship 
connecting Ukraine and the Russian Federation was not only defined as one of 
neighbouring countries involving strong economic ties, but also an extensive legislative 
portfolio. The Agreement signed by the two countries had been a guarantee of friendly 
neighbouring States’ relations and of respect and recognition of the sovereignty of 
Ukraine, however that did not stop the Russian government. Despite the propaganda 
currently spread by Russian mass media concerning the "choice of Crimeans", looking 
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over the timeline of events that took place it can be clearly seen that there was 
tremendous preparation work done before Crimea’s annexation. 
 
2.1.  Annexation 
 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary: "Annexation – possession taken of a piece of 
land or a country, usually by force or without permission." 
57 
This poses a question 
whether the separation of Crimea, which happened without a single shot fired and with 
no military action involved an annexation looking through the prism of International 
Law. The fundamental norm of interstate legislation is the prohibition of violent or 
military action. In other words, the heaviest form of illegal action in interstate relations is 
specifically considered armed attack. 
 In this case, in accordance with Chapter 7, Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, a State is entitled to use military force in self-defence, as well as to ask 
assistance of third States.
58 
This is the so-called "right" to War without an authorisation 
from the United Nations Security Council. The first person to look at the use of the term 
"annexation" concerning Crimea from Russia’s side from this point of view was Dr. 
Reinhard Merkel – a lawyer, member of the German Ethics Council and professor at the 
University of Hamburg.
59
 In his opinion, if the attachment of Crimea was an annexation, 
Ukraine would have had to defend itself from the Russian Federation, and third countries, 
similarly to USA or Germany, would have had the right to come to help, and besides – 
without a mandate from the UN. 
2.2. Opponents. Legal justification for annexation. 
 
Secession is the process by which part of the territory of an existing State breaks away 
from that State. 
60
 Dr. Reinhard Merkel’s opinion on this is supported by several Western 
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lawyers, for example, a Belgian lawyer Bernard Hanotiau – a partner in the Hanotiau & 
van den Berg law firm and a British lawyer Samuel Wordsworth, a Queen’s Council 
barrister in the Essex Court Chambers. 
 While analysing their opinions, it becomes apparent that the separatist movements 
in Crimea, which further led to a secession, appeared as a result of the political situation 
in Ukraine after Euromaidan. Moreover, according to the statements made, the 
centralised Ukrainian government has made major political mistakes- right after the vote 
of censure and election of new government officials in Kyiv, the organisers of 
Euromaidan had introduced a prohibition on the use of the Russian language as a second 
official language on Ukrainian territory (this prohibition has since been lifted). The ex-
Prime minister of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko admitted that she was "ready to grab a 
machine gun and go shoot that (..censored language, used to describe Vladimir Putin…), 
in the forehead" and "destroy these (..censored language, slur used to address 
Russians…)".61 Oleg Tyahnybok, the leader of a right-wing Ukrainian nationalistic 
political party "Svoboda", had previously reminded Ukrainians of how they had to "fight 
Germans, Jews, Russians and other scum".
62
 
 This position was also indirectly approved by the President of the USA at the 
time, Barack Obama, in an interview to CNN on February 1, 2015. In this interview, 
President Obama has said:  
"Mr. Putin made this decision around Crimea and Ukraine — not because of some grand strategy, but 
essentially because he was caught off-balance by the protests in the Maidan and Yanukovych then fleeing 
after we had brokered a deal to transition power in Ukraine"
63
 
 According to Reinhard Merkel, all the above had led to a secession, since there 
was no violence involved in Crimea becoming a part of the Russian Federation. After the 
handover of the centralised power of Ukraine, there was a referendum held in Crimea, in 
which, based on the reports by the Russian Federation itself, 84 percent of eligible voters 
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casted their vote and 97 percent out of them were in favour of being included within 
Russia’s territories.64 
 Following the referendum, the State has proclaimed itself independent, and only 
after that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea has applied to join the Russian Federation. 
The request was approved. In this way, once again according to Reinhard Merkel and his 
supporters, what happened was a peaceful separation of Crimea from Ukraine. 
 Concluding from the aforementioned, this is exactly how several lawyers and 
political figures see the situation in Crimea. Following this trail of thought, it was 
concluded that the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and the referendum were not in 
violation of International Law, since both the secession and the referendum were merely 
violating the Constitution of Ukraine. Since the Constitution of Ukraine does not apply to 
Russia, it had the right to allow the autonomous Republic joining the Federation as a 
federal subject. 
 However, the same Dr. Merkel also states that Crimea joining the Russian 
Federation just two days after gaining independence from Ukraine due to the presence of 
Russian military forces outside of its’ territories was, indeed, a violation of the 
International Law, although, in his opinion, this fact does not invalidate neither the 
separation, nor the further joining of the Russian Federation.
65
 Apart from that, he had 
made further conclusions: despite the illegal military presence of Russia outside its 
territories being a violation of the prohibition on interstate relations, "even if it prevented 
the bloody use of violence", however "in no way does it invalidate the fact that this was 
the reason for a possibility of secession."
66
 Furthermore, Dr. Reinhard Merkel has said:  
"The threat of violence [from Russia] was never directed at the residents or the Parliament of Crimea, but 
the Ukrainian army. There was a possibility of intervention from the central government [of Ukraine], 
which is why the Russian militia was blocking Ukrainian army barracks, not guarding the polling 
stations."
67
 
 Pro-Russian lawyers have embraced this point of view and even started to develop 
the topic of secession further having found a reason to claim that neither the secession 
itself, nor the referendum in Crimea was in no violation of International Law. Moreover, 
there have been claims that the presence of Russian military forces in Ukraine were 
justified and were not a violation either. 
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The following analysis will look into the reasoning mentioned behind said 
statements. Firstly, the presence of Russian militia in Crimea – outside of the 
Federation’s territories, is not considered a violation of International Law due to 
following reasons (A direct quote is included from a government-owned media outlet to 
demonstrate the position of the Russian government):  
"When the Ukrainian army was mobilised and nationalist troops headed to Crimea, the predominantly 
Russian residents of the Peninsula got scared of possible repressions or War. Taking that into account, 
the involvement of Russian troops based in Sevastopol for referendum support and protection of the 
Russian Naval Base in Sevastopol cannot be considered unjustified. To answer the question of whether 
these measures were in alignment with International Law, it is necessary to take into account the 
presence of a threat to the inhabitants of Crimea after the putsch in Ukraine, as well as the fact that USA 
and NATO would pose a threat to the Russian Naval Base in Sevastopol. If Crimea did not become a 
territory of the Russian Federation and stayed a part of Ukraine, and the putschists that came to power 
in Kyiv would have started to violate the rights of the Peninsula’s population, which would make the 
situation there similar to the East of Ukraine: a Civil War would have started, cities and villages would 
have been destroyed, thousands of people dead, and hundreds would have had to seek refuge."
68 
 All of the arguments used mentioned hypothetical predictions without a solid 
reason. For example, mentioning the residents being scared of possible repressions does 
not seem like a valid reason for military intervention. Yes, the nationalistic sentiments 
were strong during Euromaidan. However, the prevention of any illegal activity, 
including those fuelled by radical groups, was the exact reasoning behind the decision of 
the Ukrainian government to mobilise its’ army – the army which was created to defend 
the State and its population. There was no reason to claim that Crimeans were afraid of 
reparations, considering the news articles reviewed in the previous chapter clearly show 
that the government of the Autonomous Republic relied entirely on the centralised 
Ukrainian government and requested immediate measures to be taken against radical 
elements. Very general research can already reveal the lack of basis for these 
assumptions, and perhaps it was the Russian troops dislocated in Sevastopol who got 
scared of the nationalistic groups, who were, in fact, members of the general public with 
no special training or mass ammunition. 
 Moreover, the claims of USA and NATO possibly endangering the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet base and the new government possibly oppressing Crimeans have even less 
factual background to them. If such insupportable "facts" would be applied backwards, it 
could be considered that Russia placing missiles with small and medium range in 
Kaliningrad is posing a threat to most European countries, which would undoubtedly 
scare the predominantly non-Russian speaking residents of repressions and War among 
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other things. This thought process would mean that the European Union has the right to 
place military forces on the territories of Russia, which is certainly not valid or legal. 
This is obviously an exaggeration, however, so seem to be the arguments behind Russia’s 
actions.  
 It is also proposed within the same media outlets and platforms that the 
referendum in Crimea and its "self-determination" occurred as a result of the 
infringement of rights and liberties of the Crimean minorities, and that these minorities, 
as the indigenous, initiated the referendum. Moreover, it is made clear that the right for 
self-determination nations have, which is also incorporated in the United Nations charter, 
is seen as the overruling in taking decisions regarding the Crimean Peninsula. However, 
this can be objected: on October 4, 2011, a resolution was passed during a session of 
PACE in Strasbourg, which states:  
"(…)if International Law were to recognise a right of national or ethnic minorities or even, in some cases, 
national majorities, to self-determination, such a right would not give rise to an automatic right to 
secession. The right to self-determination should first and foremost be implemented by way of the 
protection of minority rights."69 
In addition, the Member States of the Council of Europe are urged to: 
"(…)refrain from recognising or supporting in any way the de facto authorities of territories resulting from 
unlawful secessions, in particular those supported by foreign military interventions."70  
Crimea had been an Autonomous Republic for several decades by that time, proving the 
possible successful existence of such a State to provide equality and liberties for the 
minorities of said region among and ease tension. 
 It seems impossible to support the point of view that considers the situation with 
Crimea to be a secession. Apart from that, no current Constitution in the world allows 
secession, including the Constitution of Ukraine. According to Article 33, the 
administrative territory of Ukraine is comprised of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 
regions, districts, cities, districts in cities and villages. Furthermore, Article 2 states that 
the sovereignty of Ukraine applies to all of its territories. Article 73 states that decisions 
made regarding the change of Ukrainian territories shall be made exclusively through a 
State-wide referendum, which was violated in the secession of Crimea.
71
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 Claiming that the only legislation violated during the secession of Crimea is the 
Constitution of Ukraine means disregarding the facts, since the military presence on 
Ukrainian territories had not been denied nether by Ukraine, nor the Russian Federation 
itself. 
 The principle of territorial integrity is in one way or another incorporated into 
every Constitution and is directed solely at the protection of the State from outer 
aggressors. This is supported by The Charter of United Nations in Part 4 of Article 2, 
stating that all Member States have to oblige to the Purposes of the UN and refrain from 
the use of military or any other aggressive force towards other independent States
72
, as 
well as further reinforced in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
73
. 
 Looking at the situation from the given perspective, the actions of Russia can 
certainly be considered to have been a violation to one of the main principles of 
International Law, established by major international bodies. 
 
2.3. Public diplomacy  
 
Unfortunately, despite the position of the international society and the disapproval of the 
acts of political aggression in Ukraine, the position of Russia remains unchanged. All 
political efforts taken by the Russian Federation are directed at justifying its behaviour in 
Crimea, and the efforts of Russian public diplomacy also are directed at the justification 
of its actions. That is the goal of the entire Russian media infrastructure – with pro-
governmental media channels and laws being passed about "foreign agents" – a title 
given to anyone publicly disagreeing with the official political powers’ point of view.74 
 In the following chapter, examples of public diplomacy actions taken by Russia 
will be presented, using both mass media and calling in representatives of Western 
political and business circles: 
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1) On September 29, 2019, a delegation of 22 diplomats from USA, Germany, 
Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium had arrived in Crimea. The delegation 
arrived for what was described as a "familiarization visit", as stated by Sputnik.
75
 
2) The Head of the German delegation: "Western media is lying about Crimea." The 
head of the delegation consisting of a German social organisation called Druschba 
Global members claims that the information provided in Western media is 
drastically different from the actual situation on the Peninsula.
76
 
 Moreover, there are dissertations being written by Russian researchers on the public 
diplomacy of Russia regarding Crimea, annotations of which have direct mentions of, for 
example, the cooperation between Crimea and Italy being explained by the interest 
towards cooperation with Russia from the Northern Italian government. Furthermore, the 
same annotation states that oppositional parties like Lega Nord or the Five Star 
Movement can use the situation in Crimea to pressure Italian governmental authorities 
and increase their influence.
77
 
  It can undoubtedly be concluded that all efforts of the Russian government are 
directed at justification of the actions taken in the Crimean Peninsula, by not only 
engaging with as many Western allies as possible, including opposing parties, 
nationalistic and even separatist movements, but also utilising all of the means used in 
Hybrid War. 
 
2.4. Hybrid War 
 
The Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the 
Russian deputy Minister of Defence, Valery Gerasimov has made a statement within his 
report that outlines the methods Russia is using and the goals it is trying to achieve, as 
well as will help identify whether Russia is involved in a Hybrid War. Within the 
statement, General Gerasimov mentioned that the rules of the War have changed and 
highlighted the use of non-military ways of achieving political and strategic targets, such 
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as informational, humanitarian and economic measures with the use of the protesting 
potential of the population, supported by military measures of a hidden character. The 
statement further mentions informational confrontation as a way of lowering the combat 
potential of the enemy.
78
 
  It is worth noting that the aforementioned had been published on February 27, 
2013, a year before the events in Crimea took place. In other words, a person holding one 
of the highest military ranks in Russia has merely "created" the manifesto of Hybrid War.  
  Even today, Russia has not given up on its methods; the accusations of Russian 
political leaders meddling with other countries’ elections keep appearing. It has already 
negatively influenced USA, Poland and the UK, and unfortunately, the "Crimean 
scenario" can possibly be executed again towards a State which the Kremlin views as a 
territory of "national interest": Belarus, Kazakhstan, and even the Baltics. 
3. PART III -WAR WITHOUT ATTACK  
3.1. Roots of the War without attack  
Today, Russia is waging a War in which its soldiers and equipment operate on foreign 
territory - without the national flag flying over them. They do this covertly, masquerading 
as various forms of international activity, from performing certain surveillance functions, 
to peacemaking, and to direct interventions under the guise of protecting the Russian-
speaking population. All these actions are supported by disinformation companies of the 
international community and cyber-attacks simultaneously. For instance, the London-
based Forensic Architecture research group collected and catalogued evidence of Russian 
military involvement in the battle of Ilovaisk in August 2014.
79
 After that, this evidence 
will be considered by the European Court of Human Rights, in a lawsuit filed by the 
European Human Rights Advocacy Centre. In total, the European Court of Human Rights 
has received more than 4000 applications in connection to the crisis in Crimea.
80
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  In November 2014, the Ukrainian military reported an intensive movement of 
troops and equipment from Russia to separatist-controlled parts of Eastern Ukraine.
81
 
OSCE Special monitoring mission to Ukraine observed convoys of heavy weapons and 
tanks in Donetsk People’s Republic controlled territory without distinguishing signs.82 
Moreover, Russia's interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine and other States, from 
interference in presidential elections to cyber-attacks on State information structures in 
various countries, is confirmed by the reports of the special adviser to the US Department 
of Justice, Robert Swan Mueller III and Gertjan Boulet is a Ph. D. candidate in Law at the 
Free University Brussels, according to whom the Pro-Russian hacker group CyberBerkut 
took responsibility for cyber operations against NATO, the system for counting votes in 
Ukrainian elections and a mobile device as part of the US Vice-President's delegation 
during a visit to Ukraine.
83
 At the same time CyberBerkut denies this fact by arguing that 
there was no Russian support.  Similarly, several security companies have found Russian 
roots in a number of cyber operations, without explicitly alleging Russia’s involvement 
or revealing the identity of their clients.  In March 2014, British security company BAE 
systems alleged the involvement of committed and well-funded professionals from within 
the Moscow time zone in the use of   "Snake" malware against Ukrainian computer 
systems.
84
 Belgian media reports within a period of year also reported the use of "Snake 
" against the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to access documents on the crisis in 
Ukraine.
85
 In October,  US company FireEye reported malware attacks by Russian hacker 
group APT28 against Eastern European governments. FireEye found consistency 
between the targeted information and Russian interests and identified malware code in 
Russian written during working hours in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
86
  Monthly 
reports of numerous companies proves that without declaring War, Russia is waging an 
economic, political, and Information War.  
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  The interventions on behalf of Russia in the territory Ukraine began with political 
actions in February 2014 when Russian presidential adviser Sergey Glazyev was 
providing instructions to Pro-Russian groups in Ukraine to create Antimaidan unrest, and 
on February 20, members of the Crimean population reported  about Russian special 
forces without any identification signs. They arrived at the Crimean Peninsula and seized 
State Council of Crimea, shortly after that, Crimea’s government declared its 
independence apart Ukraine and conducted a referendum to join the Russian Federation.
87
  
Russian army units do not cross borders, but this does not prevent the State from 
carrying out military activities, including military operations which take place the 
territory of other States, from Georgia to Ukraine. On March 1, 2014, Russian Federation 
deployed troops and military vehicles to the Crimean Peninsula and occupied the 
region.
88
 The United Nations indicated that these actions were contrary to the UN Charter 
and called upon Russia to respect the  "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine".
89
 
Some leaders condemned Russia’s actions calling them an unlawful act of aggression90, 
moreover Russia’s actions are in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.91 In 
response, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that intervention mainly was to 
defend Russian-speaking minorities in the region from the threats to life and their health, 
to protect against anti-Semitic violence and for a number of other humanitarian 
purposes.
92
  
In 2014, the entire world was faced with an unprecedented fact since the end of the 
World War II: there was a forceful seizure by the Russian Federation (a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council
93
) of part of the territory of Ukraine. These events 
can be considered as a guide to the conduct of War: The head of the Republic Sergey 
Aksyonov announces the temporary re-subordination of the power structures. This is 
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followed by his address to Russian President Vladimir Putin about ensuring peace and 
tranquillity in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
94
 
On the same day, March 1, 2014, the President of Russia requests permission 
from the Federation Council to use the armed forces on the territory of Ukraine:  
"In connection with the extraordinary situation in Ukraine, the threat to the lives of citizens of the Russian 
Federation, our compatriots, and the personnel of the military contingent of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation stationed in accordance with an international Treaty on the territory of Ukraine, on the 
basis of paragraph "d" of Part 1 of Article 102 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, I submit to the 
Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation an appeal on the use of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine until the social and political situation in this 
country is normalized."
95
  
The Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation unanimously 
supported Vladimir Putin's speech. 
On March 6, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
at an extraordinary session votes for the region's accession to Russia, while 
simultaneously appealing to the Russian President and Parliament to begin the procedure 
for granting Crimea the status of a subject of the Russian Federation. At the same 
meeting, it was decided to postpone the referendum on the status of Crimea to March 16, 
2014.
96
 In conditions of lack of time, understanding how important it is that the "Russian 
blitzkrieg" was lightning fast, without giving the world community and the Ukrainian 
Central government the opportunity to take at least some effective steps, annexation 
mechanism worked perfectly, which clearly indicates a long preparation Russia was 
ready for the development of these events in any scenario.
97
 
According to the opinion of Shane Reeves, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army and 
Associate Professor at the United States Military Academy, the guiding source for 
determining the legality of a nation’s use of force against another nation or within another 
nation’s territory is the UN Charter. Under the UN Charter there are only two legal bases 
for intervention in Crimea—UN Security Council Resolution under Article 42 when there 
are no other possible mean for restoring international peace or self-defense under Article 
51.
98
  Without an UNSCR and no justifiable claim to self-defense, a plain reading of 
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International Law prohibits a State from intervening with military force in the any 
internal conflict.
99
   
Several States, in particular Russia, have argued for an alternative international 
legal basis to justify a military intervention that is not found in the UN Charter. Relying 
on the controversial concept of humanitarian intervention which allows one State to use 
military force to stop large scale atrocities in another State, interventionists believe the 
moral imperative to act makes consent of the Security Council unnecessary. 
100
 
The origins of the humanitarian intervention use of force concept are rooted in 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force, which involved the bombing campaign in Kosovo. For 
NATO, getting a Security Council Resolution to use force in Kosovo was nearly 
impossible given two permanent members, Russia and China, opposed such action.
101
 In 
such a way, NATO intervened in Kosovo without the support of the UN Security 
Council. Despite the absence of a UN authorization to use force, NATO justified the 
intervention as a necessity to stop a humanitarian crisis.
102
 It is essential to note that in 
Kosovo the humanitarian crisis has been confirmed by all international organizations, 
including the European Court of Cuman Rights. The mass atrocities that took place in 
Kosovo in the end 20
th
 century, left no other option for NATO and the peacekeeping 
forces other than to intervene, otherwise the genocide of the State’s population threatened 
the disappearance of this people.
103
 However, regardless of the criteria, this decision will 
remain subjective, it cannot justify Russia's actions on the territory of Ukraine. This 
position is also confirmed by international legal institutions. Thus, on July 22, 2010, the 
International Court of Justice referred to by the United Nations General Assembly for its 
opinion deemed that the declaration of independence by Kosovo adopted on February 17, 
2008 had not violated International Law. The Court took note of the Security Council's 
involvement and the decisions it had made within the framework of International Law as 
well as the series of events and the attempts by the international community to find other 
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solutions to put an end  for an ethnic and religious-based genocide. It also recognized the 
legal status of Kosovo placed under the supervision of the Council, in accordance with 
the objectives contained within the Charter of the United Nations. The Court ruled  that 
the "declaration of independence has not violated the Security Council's resolution" and 
that the "declaration of independence has not violated the constitutional framework."
104
 
     It was the international community’s desire to 
abolish these types of subjective use of force decisions that was an incentive for the 
United Nations Charter. Drafted following the devastation of World War II, the Charter 
specifically prohibits the threat or use of force by any State.
105 This explicit prohibition 
is intended to prevent a State from independently determining when to invade another 
State regardless of the reason. Allowing otherwise invites a return to the Wars of 
aggression, often driven by a nationalistic agenda, which led to the destruction and 
devastating consequences of the World Wars.
106
 Consequently, any use of force by a 
State should be consistent with the UN Charter and authorized by the Security Council. 
And the fact that President Vladimir Putin used the language of a humanitarian 
interventionist to refute criticism of Russia's involvement in Crimea, his lightning 
operation on the territory of another State, indicates that all the actions of the Kremlin 
were prepared long before the intervention itself. The annexation of Crimea was seen as 
not a spontaneous action by Russia with the plan worked out for several months, but 
according to Andrey Illarionov, a former Putin advisor, at a NATO session in Lithuania, 
a conflict over Crimea with Ukraine had been planned since 2003, with a plan to begin 
the War in 2015. The Russians have kept Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation and 
have supported, supplied, and allied themselves with Pro-Russian separatists in the 
Crimea.
107
 Russia's actions in this case can be considered as a tool for conducting modern 
hybrid operations, both in Ukraine and on the territory of other States – Georgia, Syria. 
The result of this intervention was a Crimean-wide referendum.     
 The following questions were put to a General vote - a referendum – by the 
residents of Crimea: 
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1. Are you in favor of Crimea's reunification with Russia as a constituent entity 
of the Russian Federation? 
2. Are you for the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea in 
1992 and for the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?
108
 
The city Council of Sevastopol made a similar decision to join Russia as a separate 
subject of the Federation. The latter also decided to take part in the Crimean referendum. 
A new question was added to the Crimean referendum questions for residents of 
Sevastopol.  
3. Has the city of Sevastopol to become a part of the Russian Federation as a 
subject of the Russian Federation?
109
 
On March 11, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
and the city Council of Sevastopol adopted the Declaration of independence of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol at their sessions.
110
 
It should be noted that according to the Constitution of Ukraine, Sevastopol was 
not part of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. It was a city with a special status, just 
like the capital of Ukraine – Kiev. And despite the adoption of the Declaration of 
independence in Crimea, holding a referendum in a single city of the country is contrary 
to the norms of any law, even international, even Domestic Law of Ukraine or the 
Russian Federation. In addition, most Russian lawyers, in particular L.G. Berlyavskiy
111
, 
in support to the legitimacy of the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation put the 
following arguments- according to the Constitution of Ukraine of 2004, the issue of 
changing the status of the country or parts of it are solved solely on the national 
referendum (Article 73), given the unitary order of the State all matters of organization 
and procedure of elections and referendums are determined only by law of Ukraine. 
According to Ukrainian legislation, issues of legitimacy and dissolution of the Parliament 
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as compliance of legal acts adopted by 
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the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic with the Constitution of Ukraine are 
exclusively within the competence of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
112
 
It is essential to note that the session on holding the referendum was held on 
March 6, and the Declaration of independence of Crimea was adopted on March 11. That 
is, in this situation, not just a cause-and-effect relationship has been violated, but there is 
evidence of falsification of facts, indicating that in Crimea in a situation of lack of time 
all legal acts were adopted, adjusted to the goal already selected and approved by Russian 
curators. On March 16, a hastily organized referendum on the status of Crimea took 
place. There were almost no foreign observers present, since the international community 
did not recognize this referendum. The self-proclaimed Crimean government declared 
that 81.4 percent of citizens who had such a right took part in the Declaration of their 
will.
113
 On March 18, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed The Treaty between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Accession of the  Republic of 
Crimea to the Russian Federation and on Forming New Constituent Entities within 
the  Russian Federation.
114
 Previously, this decision was approved by the State Duma of 
Russia. The annexation of Crimea entails several consequences that are extremely 
adversarial for the modern system of International Law and international relations and 
relate not only to the European region, but also to the world. Russia's actions were a gross 
violation of the basic principles of International Law enshrined in the UN Charter, the 
Declaration on principles of international Law of 1970, and the CSCE Helsinki final act 
of 1975, on which the modern world order is based.
115
  
First, the principle of non-use of force
116
 because the annexation of Crimea took 
place as a result of military intervention by the Russian soldiers. Second, the violation of 
principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention
117
, namely, before the 
annexation, Russian Federation did not apply to any international authorities for 
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international disputes concerning the State ownership of the Crimean Peninsula, and even 
more so did not address to any authorities regarding its alleged harassment of the 
Russian-speaking population. Third, the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of the States
118
, particularly providing support to separatist sentiments with the 
help of prominent Russian political activists, including members of the State Duma of the 
Russian Federation, is a direct intervention in the actions of the Central government of 
Ukraine and regional authorities. Fourth, the principle of sovereign equality of the 
States
119
, thus annexation of a part of the territory of a sovereign State is a gross violation 
of this principle. Fifth, the principle of good faith implementation of international 
obligations
120
, the annexation of Crimea violated the obligations to Ukraine contained in 
the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's 
accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1994.
121
 The 
Treaty of friendship, cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation
122
, Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet of 
1997
123
, the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Russian-
Ukrainian State border of 2003
124
. Lastly, the principles of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. To this day, various public organizations and international 
observers have recorded numerous violations of human rights and freedoms in Crimea, 
the most significant of which is the persecution of Crimean Tatars
125
. 
Pointing out violations of the principles and norms of International Law by the 
Russian Federation is particularly important not only because the Russian Federation is a 
nuclear power. This is important because, by participating in the work of the UN Security 
Council and enjoying the status of its permanent member, it should be responsible for 
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maintaining international peace and security throughout the world. Disregard of the basic 
principles of International Law leads to their devaluation and, moreover, it becomes an 
example for others.  
On March 27, 2014, a vote was held on UNGA resolution 68/262 regarding the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine. According to the text of the resolution, the UNGA did not 
recognize the referendum in Crimea, as it has no legal force due to its violation of the 
internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, violation of its sovereignty and 
legislation.
126
 Today, the result of this War without attack is the ongoing annexation of 
the Crimean Peninsula and military actions in the South of Ukraine. The most important 
question is about the legal consequences of this War for Ukraine, for Russia and for the 
whole world. 
3.2. Legal implications for the international community 
The main consequence of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its actions to 
annexation the Crimean Peninsula is that today, in the 21
st
 century, a dangerous case has 
been created. Russian officials tend to quickly dismiss the security concerns of their 
Western neighbours as solely driven by anti-Russian biases that persist in these countries. 
For example, academic and activist Sergei Markov cautioned Finland against considering 
NATO membership out of such supposed nationalistic biases: Finland shall think about 
the consequences while considering joining NATO. The important aspect is that Finland 
shall ponder whether joining NATO can mark the beginning of World War III. 
Russophobia might be the reason of initiating the War because "Finland is one of the 
most Russophobic countries in Europe, after Sweden, Poland and the Baltic countries"
127
   
In case with Norway where Russia is dividing a part of the border with Norway, 
Russian Federation until nowadays is protecting of  security policy of Norway which lead 
to the occasion to become a member of NATO back in the beginning of the Cold War. 
Even the fact that Norway had warm relations with Russia in several previous years, in 
particular after the Resolution of the territorial dispute in the Barents Sea in 2010. 
Unlawful annexation of Crimean Peninsula resulted in increasing interests about Russia’s 
planned actions within the population of Norway. In addition, a Gallup poll conducted in 
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April 2015 demonstrates that Norwegian objection for the actions of Russia’s leadership 
is stronger than the resistance of the other States that have been taking part in the poll.
128
 
According to the opinion of experts from RAND-Corporation, because of the 
annexation of Crimean Peninsula, States having bordering with Russia do not feel safe 
nowadays. Even though there are agreements concluded among these States regarding the 
respect States’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.129  
According to the provisions of Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 1997, the parties assumed 
obligations to respect each other's territorial integrity and confirmed the inviolability of 
the existing borders between them. Article 3 provides that parties respect each other’s of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, disputes to be settled be peaceful 
means without use of force, including, peoples are free decide upon their fate, 
interference in other State’s internal affairs is prohibited, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms shall be respected and international obligations and other universally 
recognized norms of International Law shall not be breached.
130
  
Following the wording of the Agreement, if Russia intervened in the Crimea in 
order to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population and prevent a humanitarian 
catastrophe, in any case it was mandatory to follow to the provisions of Article 5, 
according to which parties shall hold regular consultations for strengthening bilateral 
relations and make an exchange of views regarding the multilateral issues of a  mutual 
interests. Parties may establish mixed commissions on a permanent or temporary basis to 
deal with individual issues in various fields. Thus, if Russia understood that there are 
problems or threats to the Russian-speaking population, it had to take steps to settle the 
situation by peaceful mean. However, Russia chose military intervention without any 
attempts for the peaceful settlement of the crisis by violating Article 7 of the Agreement. 
According to Article 7, in case when in the opinion of one of the Parties the crises arose 
and constitutes a threat to the peace, violates the peace or affects the interests of its 
national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, it has rights to address the other 
Party in order to hold appropriate consultations without delay. The parties shall exchange 
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relevant information and, if necessary, implement agreed or joint measures to overcome 
this situation.
131
According to Article 6 of the Treaty, parties shall refrain from supporting 
or takin part in any actions which directed against the other party. None of the States 
shall not allow its the territory to be if it threatens other States security.
132
 In violation of 
this provision Russia not only supported separatist sentiments of Crimean politicians, but 
rather provided its territory as a springboard for interventions of own military personnel 
both in Crimea. In this case, Russia violated not only the provisions of the Treaty on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership with Ukraine, but also the first principle of the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning trusted relations and 
cooperation between States in accordance with the UN Charter according to which each 
State must exempt from participating, organizing, instigating, providing assistance in acts 
of civil unrest or terrorist acts to another State or consent to organized activities on its 
territory aimed at committing such acts where the actions referred to this paragraph 
involve the threat or use of force.
133
 
 Russia's violation of these provisions and its insistence on declaring its actions to 
annex Crimea legitimate and fully in line with the principles of International Law directly 
threaten the security and territorial integrity of the States which have borders with the 
Russian Federation. The actions of the Russian Federation are a declaration of its 
superiority of the right of the strong. By acting as a nuclear power, Russia has made it 
clear that it has the right to dictate its will to States that are weaker for one reason or 
another. As a result, the international security system is being destroyed and restrictions 
imposed by International Law are being lifted in order to ensure the equality of all States. 
By seizing Crimea, Russia violated the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum 
on security guarantees in connection with Ukraine's accession to the 1994 Treaty on the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the Memorandum, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirmed to 
Ukraine their obligations, in accordance with the principles of the OSCE Final act, to 
respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and existing borders. All these States 
reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. They guaranteed that none of 
their weapons would ever be used against Ukraine, except for self-defence purposes or in 
any other way in accordance with the Charter of The United Nations. Ukraine's refusal 
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from nuclear weapons in exchange for guarantees indicated was an important step in the 
international community's fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Especially 
significant in this sense is the fact that Ukraine is faced not just with foreign aggression, 
but with the aggression of a State that, in accordance with a special international legal 
act, is one of the guarantors of its security and territorial integrity.
134
 Finally, Russia's 
aggression against Ukraine threatens the functioning of the UN Security Council, the 
body which is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. 
 
3.3. Legal consequences for Russia  
The reaction of international organizations to the annexation of Crimea to Russia 
was uncertain. On March 27, 2014, at the UN General Assembly on the issue of 
recognizing the illegality of the Crimean referendum, 100 States out of 193 UN Member 
States voted unequivocally in favor of the adoption of the Resolution, the votes of almost 
the same number of other States were distributed as follows: "against" – 11, abstained – 
58, did not vote – 246. For the most part, the international community reacted negatively 
to the annexation of Crimea to Russia.
135
  
Since the Russian annexation of Crimea, international organizations have imposed 
the following restrictions on the aggressor country, namely NATO, EU and G8. In March 
2014 NATO suspended military and civilian meetings with Russia and refused to plan 
joint military missions. In April it suspended all forms of cooperation with Russia, except 
for negotiations at the level of ambassadors and above. Later, NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly ceased its cooperation with the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 
and it closed free access to the headquarters to all employees of the Russian mission.
136
 
EU for its part  On March 25, Council of the European Union banned its embassies in 
Russia from issuing all types of visas to residents of Crimea. In April European 
Parliament adopted a Recommendation Resolution calling for the abandonment of the 
construction of the South stream gas pipeline. Later in July it imposed sanctions against 
Sberbank of Russia, VTB Bank, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank, and 
Rosselkhoznadzor. It also imposed an embargo on the import and export of weapons to 
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Russia; a ban on the export of dual-use goods and technologies for military use to Russia 
or to Russian end-users.
137
 Moreover, The European Union imposed sanctions against 
Russia, in particular on the basis of Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, 
according to which the Union may use the funds in the conduct of missions beyond the 
borders of EU in order to ensure the maintenance of peace, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations.
138
 Finally, on March 25, G8 Suspended Russia's participation. This is not 
an exhaustive list of all organizations and sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation as 
a response to its violation of International Treaties, the most substantial sanctions are 
listed.  
The list of the sanctions, both in the political and economic spheres, are gradually 
expanding. Democratic countries are determined to restore Ukraine's sovereignty and 
geopolitical balance. However, the legal consequences of aggression for Russia are 
disproportionately less sensitive than for Ukraine. Back to 2014, the international 
reaction to Russia's aggression was almost unanimous and full of determination to change 
the situation. The UN General Assembly by most votes recognized the referendum held 
in Crimea and Sevastopol as invalid. It follows from the document of the General 
Assembly that:  
"A referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on March 
16, 2014, without legal force, cannot be the basis for any change in the status of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea or the city of Sevastopol."
139
 
In addition, the UN General Assembly called on all States, international 
organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize changes in the status of Crimea 
and Sevastopol and "to refrain from any actions or steps that could be interpreted as 
recognition of any change in status".
140
  
Today, 6 years after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the rhetoric and 
behavior of Western countries towards Russia is changing. Already on June 25, 2019, 
despite a protest from Ukraine, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
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decided by a majority vote to return Russia to its membership.
141
 The legal consequences 
of Russia's annexation of Crimea for an aggressor country are negligible.  
In such a way, the European Union still had at least some influence on Russia, for 
example, with the help of the European Court of human rights or European Court of 
Justice. However, this year President Putin announced changes to the Russian 
Constitution, more specifically, the requirements of international legislation, Treaties, 
and decisions of international bodies, further can only partially apply on Russia. They 
should not restrict the rights and freedoms of people and contradict Russian 
Constitution.
142
 Therefore, once the amendments will be adopted, it will give Council of 
Europe even less leverage over Russia and, consequently, over the human rights situation 
in Crimea. 
3.4. Legal consequences for Ukraine  
After the Russian annexation Ukraine lost not only part of its own territory, but also faced 
significant economic loss.  For instance, loosing oil and gas reserves resulted in a major 
loss in GDP. In this way, Ukrainian GDP would decreased by 14.74 percent at the time 
when Russia’s GDP increased by 1.42 percent.143 In addition, in 2014 because of 
annexation the number of tourists decreased by almost 50 percent in comparison to 
2013.
144
 Moreover, Ukraine faced the most severe legal consequences of the Russian 
annexation. Among them, the most important is the violation of human rights that 
occurred since February 2014 and continues to this day, during the illegal occupation of 
Crimea by Russia.
145
          
 The most legal consequences for Ukraine are damnification of law. As long as the 
entire democratic world community is of the opinion that Crimea remains a part of 
Ukraine, this does not prevent the actual Russia's occupation over the Peninsula. This is 
since International Law often lacks clear mechanisms for influencing the guilty party. 
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Non-legal acts cannot create a right just by the fact of their existence.
146
 That is, based on 
violation of the law, an individual cannot be granted any right. After all, this was the case 
in the Baltic States, which lived in a State of annexation for decades and the Baltic States 
regained their lost independence only with the collapse of the State that existed at that 
time.
147
  
Currently all Ukraine's efforts and hopes are directed to Strasbourg where it expects 
to receive a decision of the European Court of Human Rights this year on the 
admissibility of the claim Ukraine versus Russia on human rights violations within the 
context of annexed Crimea. 
148
 In addition, on November 8, 2019, the Court of Justice 
has already held a meeting in the Hague. The Court Rejected the preliminary objection of 
the Russian Federation that the Court has no jurisdiction on the basis of Part 1 of Article 
24 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
149
 
It decided on the existence of jurisdiction on the basis of Article 24, Part 1, of the 
International Convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism. In addition, 
the Court rejected the Russian Federation's preliminary objection to the Court's lack of 
jurisdiction on the basis of Article 22 of the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All forms of Racial Discrimination.
150
 Furthermore, it unanimously rejected the 
Russian Federation's preliminary objection to the inadmissibility of Ukraine's Claim 
under the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination. Lastly, it decided on the existence of jurisdiction under Article 22 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial discrimination
151
 to 
consider Ukraine's claims under this Convention, as well as on the admissibility of the 
Claim in respect of these claims.
152
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3.5. Possibility of peaceful resolution of the situation 
The revision of the boundaries is contrary to international law. It is a direct threat to 
international security and has grave consequences for the international order that protects 
the unity and sovereignty of all States. 
Today, Ukraine is a reference point on which the principle of the inevitability of 
punishment, the principle of the triumph of equality and justice for all States of the 
United Nations is based. Therefore, the most important task is to resolve the existing 
conflict without use of weapons. The Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 adopted 
the Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, which 
institutionalized the practice of mediation, International Arbitration Courts and 
commissions of inquiry.
153
 Considering the settlement of a crisis in Ukraine, the 
reference can be made to the approach of the Rand Corporation. All of the events that 
occurred in Ukraine in 2014 – Euromaidan and Russia's annexation of Crimea is the 
result of a combination of factors, including ethnic and religious diversity, historically in 
Ukraine, took the form of internal separation.      
     To resolve the Crimean crisis, it is necessary to 
influence Russia in as much areas as possible. First, he use of soft power methods shall 
be used, namely, support for non-governmental organizations, cooperation with all 
parties of the political spectrum without exception, expert work in the field of student 
exchange, scientific grants for young professionals, as well as the propaganda potential of 
the media, television, Internet and film production. Second, the use of methods of 
economic influence is of a high importance and this is not only an extension of the 
sanctions that the international community can impose against Russia. Third, use of pre-
emptive measures by NATO shall be used, the Alliance must maintain a firm position on 
the Ukrainian crisis and make active efforts to resolve it. Lastly, participation of 
international legal institutions in one of the most significant aspects, including the 
international Court of Justice in the Hague and the European Court of Human Rights.
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CONCLUSION 
 In 2014, the Russian Federation annexed Crimea, the territory of Ukraine, which 
is a sovereign State. This act of direct aggression followed the intervention of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation witch were based on the Crimean Peninsula, including 
Sevastopol, based on an Agreement with Ukraine, the referendum and the Declaration of 
Independence of Crimea.  
The annexation of Crimea caused a serious challenge for the entire international 
community. Crimea has become the first precedent of military aggression, the seizure of 
territory by force and its incorporation into another State, despite all agreements between 
UN Member States, despite the existence of International Judicial Institutions and a 
single global security system. Today, the events in Crimea have put under question the 
whole international order and questioned the role of the international law and justice. To 
avoid it, international community has a duty to resist Russian aggression, first of all, in 
the legal field by using existing legal mechanisms, and perhaps developing new ones. 
Throughout the Bachelor thesis, considering the legal arguments that the Russian 
Federation has formulated in defence of its actions, there are evidences that the Russian 
Federation has breached International Law. The thesis also analyses the legal norms of 
Public International Law which are violated by the Russian Federation during the 
annexation of Crimea, examines the issues of international reaction and possible 
consequences of Russia's actions both for Russia and for Ukraine. In addition, thesis 
provides arguments for the further more complete and in-depth analysis of the legal 
aspects of International Law to prevent similar incidents in the future related to changing 
the borders of the existing world, with a threat to the security of the world community 
and specific countries.  
By answering the main question throughout the Bachelor thesis: ''How has Russia 
breached international law to seizure a territory of another State while explaining in the 
society legitimacy of its actions?'', the thesis provides the following conclusion. 
Today, even when most countries of the world hold the opinion that Crimea 
remains the part of Ukraine, this does not prevent the actual annexation of Russia over 
the Crimean Peninsula. The world community shall not allow a situation where it would 
be impossible to cancel the results of the illegal annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, the 
history of the Baltic States that existed under occupation for several decades shall not be 
repeated, so that after a certain period of time the illegal act of annexation of Crimea 
could not be recognized as having legal consequences and incorporated into the Russian 
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Federation. The efforts of the international community in the field of international law 
shall be focused on ensuring that the problem of the annexation of Crimea does not lose 
its relevance and never becomes academic. So that Ukraine's right and territorial integrity 
are restored, and the aggressor country shall receive the punishment that will be provided 
for it in strict accordance with the law. 
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